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ABSTRACT 
Tyler D. Abboud: The Roots of Terror 
Under the Direction of Gregory Young 
  
Though originally ascertaining that both blowback and interest sharing were the 
primary causal factors giving rise to Salafist terrorism from 1991-2010, the project found 
evidence supporting the idea that the two concepts are related instead. Blowback, 
specifically from “direct interventions,” increases interest sharing by providing Salafist 
terrorist groups with the means to expand their objectives to make their fight seem like 
that of ordinary citizens thereby swelling their numbers. It can also lead to the 
unification of various groups who previously may have had no common goals. In turn 
these intertwining phenomenon lead to more attacks and damage done by Salafist terror 
groups. Blowback can particularly rear itself if the intervening state utilizes a level of 
force that is neither light nor heavy and falls within a middle ground of troop numbers. 
The intervening states in the Middle East pursued that avenue, which ultimately led to the 
increase in Salafist terrorism.   
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Preface  
 This project culminates in work that actually began when I was a freshman 
starting at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Being infatuated with the Middle East, 
even from a very young age, I knew that it is what I wished to have my future research 
focus on. As an individual of Arabic heritage, the Middle East means a great deal to me. 
As such I wish to one day see peace dominate the region instead of conflict. Obviously as 
one man I cannot complete that gargantuan task, but by researching the roots of terrorism 
I can certainly get a step in the right direction.  
 Though primarily I did the work in this project it was not without the major 
assistance of many people. The obvious thanks go first to my parents, both of whom 
inspired me to always discover and learn as much as possible from an early age. As both 
of them pay for my tuition, a major thanks is in order for them in that vein too, as this 
project would not be possible without those dollars. Furthermore, I would like to thank 
my girlfriend Megan, because without her I do not think I would have the collegiate work 
ethic I have today necessary to complete this project. I would also like to thank all three 
of my advisers, each of whom assisted this project in their own helpful way. Without 
them this work would probably not be complete.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Americans are inundated with constant coverage of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), and quite often the news is rather bleak. One need not be an academic to 
determine that the GWOT, or as President Barrack Obama refers to it the “War on Al-
Qaeda,” has not gone according to plan. Far from being a model of success, the Middle 
East today appears more plagued with violence and instability than it did on September 
11, 2001, and certainly more so than any time in recent history; this despite the fact that 
over the course of the last ten years in monetary terms, the United States has spent 
approximately $1.283-1.6 trillion fighting the GWOT.1 That number does not even 
include the extra $1.3 trillion the US is estimated to be spending in veterans care either.2 
Corresponding with those unfathomably high levels of spending is a 58% increase in the 
number of Salafist Islamist terror groups and a tripling in the number of attacks attributed 
to such groups according to the RAND Corporation.3 Fatalities resulting from terrorism 
have increased fivefold since 2000, which is the year before the GWOT began.4 
Discovering the why of these disastrous results will be the focus of the study. Particular 
emphasis will be placed on globalization and blowback from various military decisions.  
Chapter 2: Hypothesis  
The two reasons accounting for a proliferation in Salafist terrorism from 1991-
2010 are: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thompson, Mark. "The $5 Trillion War on Terror." US The 5 Trillion War on Terror Comments. Time 
Magazine, 29 June 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. <http://nation.time.com/2011/06/29/the-5-trillion-war-on-
terror/>. 
2 Waterman,Shaun. "War Veterans’ Care to Cost $1.3 Trillion." Washington Times. The Washington 
Times, 5 June 2010. Web. 08 Mar. 2015. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/29/war-
veterans-care-to-cost-13-trillion/?page=all.  
 
3 Jones, Seth G. "Increase in Jihadist Threat." RAND Corp. RAND Corp., 4 June 2014. Web. 30 Aug. 2014. 
4 “”	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1. Globalization: Rapid communication and the spreading of norms have 
increased Salafist terror group’s ability to engage in interest sharing. 
Which is the capability for various Salafist terror groups with related 
interests to disseminate to the broad public and bind together in order to 
participate in the coordination of a common goal (i.e. the destruction of 
an un-Islamic state).  
2. Blowback: Primarily from American military decisions, such as the 
liberally applied drone and air strikes or the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. 
This category will be subdivided between “direct” and “indirect” 
intervention tactics. The blowback effect most likely occurred from 
2001-2011.  
Chapter 3: Terminology 
In a declassified report on the overthrow of Iran’s Mohammad Mossadegh in 
1953, the CIA defined blowback as the “unintended consequences of US governmental 
activities abroad.” Though it was written with covert operations in mind it is certainly a 
concept that can apply to overt ones as well. Specifically overt decisions like direct and 
indirect military interventions. Globalization is a highly abstract term. As such it is 
somewhat more difficult to accurately define. Bernal’s definition suffices to explain the 
basics: the “process in which the barriers to the flow of international goods, services, 
capital, money, and information are being increasingly eroded or eliminated.”5 The 
information aspect of that definition is the most important in regards to terrorism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bernal Santa-Olaya, Elena Begona, Sharon Bissel, and Ana Cortes. "Effects of globalization on the efforts 
to decriminalize abortion in Mexico." Development42.4 (1999): 130-133. 	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It is somewhat of a truism in international relations that terrorism is difficult to 
define. Therefore a clear-cut definition of terrorism must be provided so as to avoid 
misconstruing terrorist attack data. For that purpose, the definition professed by the 
University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) will be used. The GTD 
defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-
state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion 
or intimidation.”6 That definition is also the exact same as the one professed by Lafree 
and Dugan. The emphasis being on “non-state actor.” The definition is generally agreed 
upon by academic and legal scholars and is largely in keeping in line with other 
definitions of terrorism from the FBI’s to the Department of Defense. Some may find it 
controversial to not include states as part of that definition, which is understandable, as 
they can certainly engage in terrorist activities of their own. However, the purpose of the 
study is not to discover the factors giving rise to state terrorism and it would do a 
disservice to the conclusions to attempt to do so and incorporate that extra factor in.  
The attack data will concern only those that occurred in a Middle Eastern country, 
not those originating from a certain country. Essentially this means that the 9/11 attacks, 
though coming from a cell in Germany and financed from a Salafist group of Arabs in 
Afghanistan, would not count as part of the data. The Al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole 
in the Yemeni port of Aden in 2000 however, serves as an example that will count 
towards the data. The distinction is important. Choi states that in a globalized world the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 "The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)." Honor the 
Victims of Terrorism. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. <http://honormonument.org/2014/03/06/the-national-
consortium-for-the-study-of-terrorism-and-responses-to-terrorism-start/>. 
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differences between “domestic” and “transnational” terrorism are largely arbitrary.7 That 
is why this project will make no arbitrary divisions between the two and will only focus 
on those attacks occurring in the Middle East.   
As the “Middle East” can often be a confused term, it would be best to define it as 
well. Insofar as this project will be concerned, the Middle East will come to mean the 
area stretching from Morocco, above the Sahara Desert, to Afghanistan (Figure 1). A 
region normally referred to as the “Greater Middle East,” will simply be Middle East 
throughout the paper. While it does not go so far as examining every Middle Eastern 
country in detail, this project will capture some of the broad trends in the Salafist terror 
movement that have led to its proliferation. The project will omit Turkey as a source of 
data. Turkey has been beset by attacks from Salafist terror groups in the last 20 years, but 
more often than not an attack in Turkey could actually come from a Marxist, Kurdish, or 
radical nationalist group. Overall attack data could not be utilized reliably in such a 
mixed climate, meaning Turkey will not be a part of this projects definition of the Middle 
East.  
Only Salafist terror groups will be analyzed as a part of the project. Salafist 
groups are those that subscribe to highly conservative and authoritarian traditions within 
Sunni Islam. The term “Salafist” will be used as opposed to misnomers like “Jihadist” or 
specific groups like Al-Qaeda. The former is a misunderstood term that is inappropriately 
given to terror groups by Western media and punditry, while the latter is simply too 
specific to obtain reliable data. Also, some groups may choose to attack under a different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Choi, Seung W. "Does US Military Intervention Reduce or Increase Terrorism?" Diss. U of Illinois at 
Chicago, 2011. Abstract. American Political Science Association (2011): pg. 21 	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name while still carrying out the attack under the leadership of “Al-Qaeda Central” or an 
affiliated group such as Al-Shabbab in Yemen or Somalia; hence the reason why this is a 
Salafist terror analysis, not an Al-Qaeda one. Hezbollah, the Kurdish PKK, and other 
terror groups in the Middle East are certainly worth study, yet they will not be a part of 
this one. These groups do not fall under the Salafist banner, and therefore, their reasons 
for proliferating are different. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza, though ostensibly 
Salafist groups will not be a part of the study. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict would 
simply add too many issues to deal with reasonably in the project.  
Chapter 4: Methodology 
“America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us 
will ever forget this day.”8 So declared President George W. Bush the day of the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001. It is a speech somewhat erroneously attributed to the 
beginnings of the GWOT, which actually began under the Reagan Administration in the 
1980’s against drug cartels and Marxists in Latin America. Regardless, it is indicative of 
the nature of the threat that both the world and the US faced. In scholarship, many 
attempts at understanding the terrorist threat would arise in some capacity.  Yet, often 
times it seems that the applications they provide are too broad so as to appropriately 
understand the nature of the particular group or groups engaged in terrorism. Authors like 
Pape, Jones, Walters and Choi analyze terrorism in a context that somewhat lumps all of 
the groups together. Instead, this project will analyze terrorism with a region and 
ideological centric approach that will provide more specific answers that keep context in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Bush, George W. "Statement by the President in Address to the Nation." The White House. N.p., 11 Sept. 
2001. Web. 06 Mar. 2015. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-
16.html 	  
	   10	  
mind. That is not to say that the work of the broad terrorism analysts will not be featured 
in the work, just that it will take a more specific approach. 
The years analyzed in this project will be 1991-2010, herein referred to as the 20-
year period. These dates are not chosen randomly. 1991 is roughly the end of the Cold 
War and is the year of the first Gulf War. At that time there was no superpower rivalry to 
contend with for the United States, which led then President George H.W Bush to declare 
that the “new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration, and an opportunity.”9 With that 
“new world order” in mind, the United States would embark on a new set of policy goals 
and challenges, defined by a new set of geo-political interests. 2010 is the end date due to 
the collection of data. Terrorism data is rather difficult to obtain and often times does not 
arrive until a few years after the incident occurred, at least in terms of who the blame can 
be assigned to and the numbers who perished or were injured in a given attack.  
To start the project will offer a rudimentary history of the Salafist movement in 
general and Al-Qaeda in particular. This historical background is by no means intended 
to serve as an all-encompassing project, but rather provides necessary details to 
understand how the dreads of Salafist terrorism ensconced the Middle East. Following 
that brief discussion the project will turn to the variables: blowback and interest sharing. 
Within each variable there may exist certain sub-categories, and they will be addressed as 
necessary.  
As mentioned previously, terrorism data is difficult to obtain. Prescribing attacks 
to groups is the more mysterious task. The reasons why lie in the nature of terrorism itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 George Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 
1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253  	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While there is much emphasis on “lone wolf” attacks in the US and West Europe, this is 
particularly frustrating when dealing with states that are saturated with hundreds or 
thousands of attacks annually, like Iraq. Even in the West, entire court cases and 
investigations that go on for years can be had over whether or not an individual was 
attacking at the behest of a group or by his own means. Imagine the difficulty of 
discerning lone wolf versus group terror in an area that lacks adequate police and 
intelligence services. The GTD prescribes as many attacks as it can, but many of them are 
categorized as “unknown.” This makes data from religiously and ethnically 
heterogeneous states like Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon difficult to specify. An attack could 
easily come from a Kurdish, nationalist, Shiite, or Salafist group and it is almost 
impossible to know barring on the ground live witnessing of the incident. To mitigate that 
uncertainty, only newspaper accounts could be used. For instance if an attack is 
prescribed by the GTD as being “unknown,” a search of the date and location could 
reveal the actual perpetrator in some news accounts. This is not a perfect way of dealing 
with terrorism data, but in light of the circumstances it is the best available option. 
Furthermore, when attack data is listed it will count all those attacks that occurred, 
meaning it could include deaths, or could be just an attack on a piece of infrastructure 
like an oil pipeline.  
When it comes to the “direct” and “indirect” intervention sections roughly the 
same method will be used. First both require definition. What can be called “direct” 
intervention mostly calls to mind the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan Wars. They involve the 
mass mobilization of troops, diplomats, advisers, and private contractors in order to carry 
	   12	  
out a war; this definition is the same as that expressed by Pearson and Baumann.10 The 
most recent direct interventions by the US, in Afghanistan and Iraq, included major 
occupations that separate them from the original Iraq War, wherein the United States 
militarily expelled Iraq from Kuwait and exited after a few months. The United States 
along with its NATO and Western European allies have been the primary state engaging 
in direct interventions in the Middle East, though it would not be incorrect to label the 
Syrian government’s current Civil War as a “direct” intervention also. This section will 
rely on troop deployment numbers, provided to Congress annually, and compare them to 
the fluctuations in terrorism numbers (percentage increases, total attacks, etc).  
“Indirect” interventions will be categorized differently. These involve the 
application of force, absent the utilization and deployment of troops on a large scale, 
namely via drone or air strikes and cruise missiles. Data from US drone and airstrikes are 
somewhat, though not much, easier to obtain compared to terrorism data, thanks to the 
work done by organizations like the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the New 
America Foundation. What will be very difficult is discerning the number of militants 
killed versus the number of civilians killed. Much the same problem from terrorist attacks 
comes up, but with somewhat of a legal twist.  The United States, namely under the 
Obama Administration, utilizes “signature strikes,” whereby military aged males who 
adhere to a certain personality pattern are targeted and killed, often times without 
knowing their names.11 This is the opposite of a “personality strike,” where certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Choi, Seung W. "Does US Military Intervention Reduce or Increase Terrorism?" Diss. U of Illinois at 
Chicago, 2011. Abstract. American Political Science Association (2011): pg. 4. 	  
11 Williams, Brian G. "Inside the Murky World of 'Signature Strikes' and the Killing of Americans With 
Drones." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 31 May 2013. Web. 08 Mar. 2015. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-glyn-williams/nside-the-murky-world-of-_b_3367780.html.  	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terrorist leaders are known and nominated to be on President Obama’s “kill list.”12 Unlike 
troop numbers, the number of strikes is rarely publicized. To overcome the lack of 
transparency, information from non-government organization reports such as Human 
Rights Watch or Amnesty International will suffice.  
Chapter 5: The GWOT Today  
Most Americans, indeed any individual born after the Cold War, have had to deal 
with a majority of their life in wartime United States. Though not as apparent as World 
War II or as divisive as the Vietnam War, it is a fact that permeates American life and 
dominates headlines. Particularly infuriating is the fact that despite the trillion dollar 
costs, along with hundreds of thousands of lives expended, there appears no end in sight 
to the GWOT. Just recently both the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have been “temporarily” 
continued in order to combat the scourge that is Salafist terrorism.13 This occurs while the 
United States and its allies are actively targeting Salafist terror groups in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Libya, Syria and Pakistan.14 So what began 
in October 2001 as an effort to rid Al-Qaeda of a safe haven in Afghanistan as a response 
to 9/11 has become a global conflict dominated by the US. The GWOT is one of those 
passively accepted topics that Americans may find becoming a permanent reality if 
solutions are not developed. The only method by which these solutions can be developed 
is via rigorous analysis of the roots of Salafist terrorism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Currier, Cora. "Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes." Journalism in the Public Interest. 
Propublica, 05 Feb. 2013. Web. 03 Mar. 2015. <http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-
far-about-drone-strikes>. 
13 Rizzo, Jim S. "Hagel: Unlike Iraq, Afghans 'want Us Here'" CNN. Cable News Network, 08 Dec. 2014. 
Web. 08 Dec. 2014. 
14 Gilsinan, Kathy. "The Geography of Terrorism." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 18 Nov. 2014. 
Web. 08 Mar. 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/the-geography-of-
terrorism/382915/.  	  
	   14	  
The current rise in terror proliferation is not up for debate and a near consensus in 
terrorism research supports the idea of a constant Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda affiliated terror 
growth in the Middle East. Specifically, a few Middle Eastern states that will remain the 
focus of the work; the main focus will be on Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and 
Egypt as they have undergone a rapid Salafist terror expansion and feature a litany of 
other problems including poor governance, sectarian divisions, and constant economic 
troubles.   
Middle East Map Figure 115 
 
 
Chapter 6: Alternative Theories  
  
 The project hypothesized that blowback and interest sharing are responsible for 
Salafist terror growth in the 20-year period. However it did not mention why certain 
variables were omitted or placed as a sub category within those two main variables. That 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Figure 1: Notice that Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Turkey, and Pakistan are not highlighted for 
reasons discussed in the “Preliminary Definitions” section.  
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is the purpose of this section, where theories such as poverty, mental illness, democratic 
deficits, and the Clash of Civilizations will be briefly noted as to demonstrate why they 
are not included in the discussion. It should be further noted that this is not an attempt to 
disprove past work, but rather demonstrate why those theories on terrorism do not work 
within the confines of this project. Then this section will end by briefly introducing the 
project’s hypothesizing variables, blowback and interest sharing.  
Poverty 
 
At the outset of the project, poverty was considered as part of the factors giving 
rise to Salafist terrorism. Some credence can be lent to this when one considers that the 
states most beleaguered by terrorism in the Middle East, like Yemen and Iraq, have 
entirely different socio-economic scenarios when compared to Kuwait and Qatar, who are 
rarely afflicted by terrorism. Some academic evidence suggests a link between poverty 
and violence, as Goodhand notes “poverty is one of a number of factors that may 
contribute to violent conflict.”16 In modern criminology as well there has been a correct 
tendency to associate rises in poverty with rises in crime. However, that does not seem 
the case with Salafist terrorism, at least in the Middle East.   
While the Salafist terror groups have been known to provide rudimentary services 
for various peoples in the past so as to win their favor,17 this never came up as a growth 
factor. Certain Marxist and nationalist groups can attribute some gain to this, like the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, but time and time again no causal link could be found between 
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Salafist terror proliferation and poverty. Indeed far too many Middle Eastern states were 
impoverished and had very limited Salafist, or any other form, of terror attacks in their 
history. Examples include Iraq prior to 2002 and Syria prior to 2011.18 This is further 
compounded by the fact that the majority of Salafist terror architects, like Sayyid Qutb, 
Osama bin-Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others were from privileged, middle class, or 
academic backgrounds. The same can be said of Salafist foot soldiers as Kepel concludes 
they are “the privileged children of an unlikely marriage between Wahhabism and the 
Silicon Valley.”19 The lack of impoverished Salafist terrorists fighting for monetary 
opportunity is why Krueger and Maleckova arrive at a similar conclusion determining 
there is “little direct connection between poverty… and support for terrorism.”20 
The very nature of terrorism speaks to the necessity of some education and money. 
Guns, bombs, and ally forging all require cash, usually in hard or tangible currency. So it 
would make little sense for a terror group to be forged by poverty, there would be hardly 
anything to attack without those above-mentioned items. Similarly weapons knowledge, 
tactics and strategy require education, at least the ability to read.  It is exactly why many 
terrorists, according to Crenshaw, “are young, well-educated, and Middle-Class in 
background.”21 Finally, in the modern age terrorists need the ability to access technology 
so as to communicate quickly. This is especially true of younger members, where “there 
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is greater probability that recently recruited members of terrorist organizations are more 
competent in using the information technologies,” according to Cvrtilla and Peresin. 22 
This idea of technological communication will be discussed later in the “interest sharing” 
section. Poverty should not be thought of as a growth factor for terrorists, but rather as 
something that they can exploit.  
Mental Illness 
 While not a popularly expressed variable in terms of academic literature, it can 
sometimes be the case that media portrayals attempt to explain Salafist terrorists as 
stemming from insanity or mental illness. Due to its banality, the project will not cover 
this issue in great detail. Insanity is more of criminal plea than a medical concept, but it 
has come up from time to time. However, it is worth noting that none of the Al-Qaeda or 
Salafist terror architects displays any traits resembling psychological or mental issues. 
Their decisions, while cold and barbaric, are almost always taken with the most rational 
and careful of thought. Terrorism in general is always done with a specific set of goals in 
mind and almost never done at random. If an individual perpetrated a terrorist act 
displaying mental disturbances this could not be the case.  
The popular discussion of mental illness as a growth factor in terrorism most 
likely arises from a case of mistaken identity of the word suicide in “suicide terrorism.” 
However, even that most egregious form of terrorism is “designed to achieve specific 
political purposes,” according to Pape.23 Generally those who do engage in suicide terror 
do not fit a specific psychological profile, as one would expect. Finally, Borum notes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cvrtila, Vlatko, and Anita Perešin. "The Transformation of Terrorism and New Strategies." Politička 
misao 05 (2009): 121-139. 
 
23 Pape, Robert. Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Random House, 2005. 	  
	   18	  
“mental illness and abnormality are typically not critical factors in terror behavior.”24 In 
the same study he found that instances of mental illness among incarcerated terrorists 
were actually lower than that of the general population. So it would make little sense to 
describe the rise in Salafist terror in the Middle East as a result of deep found 
psychological problems in the minds of Sunni Arabs that have increased in the last 20 
years.  
Democratic Deficits 
 The lack of democracy as a source of terror can be labeled “democratic deficits.” 
This line of thinking posits that the lack of the ability for people to participate in the 
political process encourages their anger and causes them to revolt with violence or 
terrorism. There is some correlation to indicate its validity. The Middle East lacks a true 
democracy and is responsible for a large majority of the world’s terrorism. Yet, even this 
does not paint the full picture and a conflicting correlation presents challenges. The three 
states responsible for most Salafist terrorism in the 20-year period are Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Algeria. They account for 89.3% of attacks according to Graph 1. Those three states 
all faced massive direct interventions, two of them by a democracy and one by an 
authoritarian government. Indeed the growth of Salafist terror in Syria today or in Iraq 
after US troops exited serve as stark reminders that democratic deficits cannot claim full 
responsibility for terror increases.   
 Still Crenshaw is an advocate of the democratic deficit view by claiming, “in 
situations where paths to legal expression are blocked…revolutionary terrorism is doubly 
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likely…”25 A slight correlation can be found on that basis too. One fact nearly all of Al-
Qaeda’s core members have in common is that they hail from authoritarian governments; 
Bin Laden and Zawahiri come from Saudi Arabia and Egypt respectively. Michael 
Scheuer’s book, Imperial Hubris lends support to the idea of democracy deficits 
sponsoring terrorism when he opines that the US is shooting itself in the foot by 
sponsoring Middle East dictatorships, like Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s, and trying to fight 
terrorism.26 Scheuer believes that this is one of the many reasons why terrorism has 
grown so much in the Middle East. There is a problem with these ideas though. Since the 
creation of the modern nation-state system after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1683 there 
has never been a modern democratic Arabic state. One would expect that Salafist 
terrorism would have spiked generations ago, as opposed to in the last 20 years, had the 
lack of democracy been a significant precipitating factor. Yet, that is not the case; while it 
is likely that some Salafist terrorists joined Al-Qaeda because they could not vote or 
politically express themselves, it does not seem like the primary cause. There may be a 
legitimacy issue, but that will be reserved for the interest sharing section.  
The Clash of Civilizations  
  
 There is a tendency in political and academic discourse to describe terrorism as 
retaliatory for “what we are” as opposed to “what we do.” To everyday Americans, and 
indeed many politicians, this logic has a sort of feel good aspect to it. It is akin to the oft 
repeated, “why do they hate us so much” phrase. President Bush largely expressed the 
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idea following the 9/11 attacks when he declared, “America was targeted for this attack 
because we are the brightest beacon of freedom… in the world.”27 Even Presidents 
Clinton and Obama have chimed in with similar remarks at one point or another. Largely 
modeled after Samuel Huntington’s famous Clash of Civilizations argument whereby 
“the great divisions among humankind and the dominant source of conflict will be 
cultural,” this thesis is highly popular when the GWOT is discussed.28 The Clash of 
Civilizations predicts that the bulk of the world’s future conflicts will take place between 
“Islam” and “the West” for several reasons. Chief among them are the expansion of 
“Western” liberal and democratic values, unrivaled US power, and the growing 
importance of religion. Yet none of these ideas can entirely stand up to scrutiny.  
Studies like Eubank and Weinberg’s can certainly lend credence to the Clash 
thesis when they note that most terrorist organizations prefer to attack Western-
democratic states.29 However they are largely keeping in line with the arbitrary 
distinction between “transnational” and “domestic” terror. They tend to forget that 
Salafist terror organizations are capable of, and often attempt, both types of operations. 
Both are integral to the group’s overall mission. Furthermore this only shows what the 
target is, not the reasons for the attacks. Raw data also demonstrates no basis to support 
the idea of democracy under attack. Indeed one look at Graph 1 shows that most Salafist 
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terror attacks have occurred in places that are not democratic at all like Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Algeria, Egypt, and Yemen.  Overall from 1991-2010 Afghanistan would actually 
account for 41% of Salafist terror attacks, with nearly all of that occurring from 2003-
2010. In the 1990’s the situation was largely the same, especially in the Middle East, 
where both Algeria and Egypt were the dominant recipients of Salafist terror attacks. 
Even today the situation is similar. While these attacks are only taken from the Middle 
East, they are indicative of broader worldwide trends, since only a scant few Salafist 
terror attacks occur in Europe or the US. Of the Global Peace Index’s ranking of states 
most afflicted by terrorism today three of them are in the Middle East; Iraq, Syria, and 
Afghanistan. The other two, Nigeria and Pakistan, are at its peripheries.30 None of those 
five states display the democratic or “Western” values that “Islam” is supposed to loathe 
so viscerally.  
Attitudes in the Middle East do not suggest a visceral hatred for the Western 
world for the reasons Huntington describes. Instead it is the policies of the Western world 
that are the drivers of anger. One can see this effect in simple polling data. The two most 
important issues for Arabs from 2008-2011 (the only years polled) were the Iraq War and 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. If one were to consider Pape’s conclusion that occupations 
increase suicide terrorism, this should be expected. Both of those issues involve military 
occupations. No doubt Salafist terrorists, especially Bin Laden, prey off of the popular 
mood against them. The fact that both of those policies are driven by Western states 
should not be construed as supporting the Clash of Civilizations thesis. As of 2010, 47% 	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of Arabs polled held an unfavorable view of the US, but compared to the 64% of them 
who had similar feelings in 2008 this is actually an improvement. That improvement did 
not coincidentally correlate with the drawdown of US Military forces in Iraq. Though the 
number of attacks did increase in those years, the number of deaths from those attacks 
decreased from approximately 5,000 in 2008 to 3,000 in 2010.31 Certainly the two issues 
are related, as Salafist groups could no longer muster the major attacks they did in 
previous years with improved feelings toward the US. Primarily what it suggests is that 
Sunni Arab minds’, and those of any other culture, are not fixed realities of cultural 
hatred, but rather capable of altering to changing circumstances.  
Graph 132 
 
The Clash of Civilizations thesis does posit that violence can be expected within 
one of Huntington’s general groups between sub-categories of those groups. This 
immediately draws to mind the “Sunni-Shia” divide so often talked about in the media. 
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However, there is no correlation to suggest that an inter-religious Sunni-Shia society is 
more prone to Salafist terrorism. Of those five states primarily responsible for Salafist 
terror in Graph 1, three are relatively homogeneous as can be seen in Table 1.20. It is 
quite likely that living in a homogenous state, like Egypt, makes one more prone to view 
Shia as non-Muslim. A poll taken by the Council on Foreign Relations shows that only 
42% of Sunnis in Egypt believe Shia to be real Muslims, whereas 53% do not.33 In Iraq 
and Lebanon, both states that have undergone vicious civil wars in the last 30 years and 
are heterogeneous, large majorities of Sunnis view Shia as real Muslims. So it makes 
little sense to suggest that “culture,” as Huntington defines it, is the dominant source of 
conflict and terrorism in the world	  today.  
Percentage of Sunni/Shia Population as of 2010 Table 134 
 Afghanistan Algeria Egypt Iraq Yemen 
Sunni 87.5% 99% 95% 45% 65% 
Shia 12.5% N/a <1% 48% 35% 
 
 The paper will now turn to the two primary variables.  
Blowback 
Instead of “what we are,” Salafist terrorism actually responds more often to “what 
we (or others) do.” As Eland notes “All of the examples of terrorist attacks on the United 
States can be explained as retaliation for US intervention abroad.”35 This includes both 
the 1993 World Trade Center and September 11th attacks. Though discussing only those 	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attacks that occurred on US soil or specifically against US individuals abroad (i.e. the 
1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia) the point is still an important one. These 
notions are highly controversial and are not meant to demean the US, but rather to 
demonstrate what it is that ignites terror groups. Terrorist attacks cannot simply be 
explained by something as abstract and ambiguous as “culture” or “Islam.” Even the 
Pentagon’s Defense Science Board in a 1997 report described a “strong correlation 
between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terror attacks 
against the US.” Though it is somewhat controversial to say, Salafist terrorist groups, like 
all terrorist groups, do not attack values; they attack tangible targets to influence policy.  
A subset of blowback sees democracies as particularly susceptible to terrorism. 
Pape advocates for democracies as being more susceptible when he concludes the 
“strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern 
democracies…”36 Though he is only referring to suicide terror attacks, which make up 
only 5% of overall terrorist attacks,37 the point is overall the same. These attacks are also 
the most fear inducing and powerful, responsible for nearly 70% of terrorism deaths. The 
idea that democracies are more susceptible to terrorism is that their populace is less likely 
to support aggressive action abroad if faced with the threat of terrorism and will pressure 
their government to withdraw or deescalate the use of force. An example is that of Spain, 
who following the Madrid bombings in 2005 decided to pull their troops out of Iraq. 
Another is the US in the 1980’s, who exited Lebanon following the Marine Barracks 
bombing.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   25	  
Blowback can be discussed in terms of both direct and indirect interventions. 
Speaking at a 2013 Senate Committee hearing Farea Al-Muslimi, a Yemeni journalist, 
described how “What the violent militants have failed to achieve, one drone strike 
accomplished in an instant.”38 That “achievement” is a long sustained anger at the US for 
a drone strike in the town of Wessab, Yemen that failed and killed scores of innocent 
civilians as opposed to the intended target.  It is not just drone strikes in the eyes of 
blowback advocates though. Scheuer determined that “ US policies and actions in the 
Muslim world provide Muslims eyes’ with incontrovertible proof of what Bin Laden calls 
an ‘ocean of oppression.”39 In other words, US support for status quo policies, militarism, 
and authoritarianism are causing terrorism, not just drones. It remains to be seen which of 
those specifically causes terrorism the most, but this project assumes that direct and 
indirect intervention are the primary causal factors.  
Interest Sharing  
Recall the definition of terrorism by the GTD. The emphasis was on the 
perpetrator being a “non-state actor.” Much has been written on the growth of non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s) over the past 20 years. However, most of that 
writing only recounts the benign or positive aspects of NGO growth, citing organizations 
like Amnesty International or Doctors Without Borders ability to promote adherence to 
human rights and medicinal norms. There is a flipside though to NGO expansion; 
terrorist groups are a militant form of NGO who can expand their interests and norms in a 
similar manner.  As such literature relating to the structure and growth of NGO’s can also 
be used to help explain terror expansion. Occasionally NGO growth can be referred to as 	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norm proliferation, but this paper will call it “interest sharing” instead. Interest sharing is 
essentially the idea that the number of grievances has expanded so drastically as to give 
rise to a violent backlash. These grievances can be expanded in numerous fashions that 
will be discussed later on. Broadly speaking, by engaging in interest sharing terrorist 
groups have the ability to increase bonds with likeminded groups and individuals, thereby 
increasing their power. It is akin to the process of “coalition building” that states engage 
in to confront various issues militarily. There is little that quantative analysis can do to 
explain interest sharing, so this section will rely significantly more on qualitative analysis 
instead.  
Chapter	  7:	  History	  
Much like any political actor, coming to terms with the history of Al-Qaeda’s and 
Salafist terror group’s formation is imperative to understanding how and why the groups 
react to certain situations in the present. This project does not intend to inundate the 
reader with the history of Al-Qaeda and how it came about exactly, however it will 
explore some basics and discuss them in this section. Unfortunately, while in the post-
9/11 world much has been written in the academic literature concerning the strategies of 
Al-Qaeda and their effectiveness, little has been written regarding the raw history of the 
various Salafist movements in general and of Al-Qaeda specifically. To fill this void the 
project will turn to a few historical narratives written on the subject.  
Conservative Islam and its affiliated interpretations have existed since the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad nearly 1400 years ago. Though its contemporary roots can be 
traced to Muhammad al-Wahhab, a prominent 18th century Islamic thinker who assisted 
in the creation of the modern Saudi state. The strictly conservative ideology professed by 
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Wahhab and likeminded individuals would go on to inspire later thinkers and activists. In 
this sense, there is nothing new with political Islam, which is crudely the idea that a 
society and its government should be led by the laws established in the Quran and Hadith, 
known as Sharia Law. While these ideals all form a rough basis for Salafist terror they do 
not do much justice in explaining its resurgence. Islamic militaries of course have existed 
too and it was only with the end of the Ottoman Empire following World War I that they 
formally dissolved. While periods of unrest have existed in the Middle East since that 
time these conflicts were almost always nationalistic in nature, and it has not been until 
recently that they became religious. The Yemeni Civil War, the 1967 and 1973 wars 
between Israel and the Arab states, and the Iraqi invasion of Iran all trace their origins to 
conflicts based in Arab nationalism as opposed to religion. However the seedlings of 
religious conflict and Salafist terror can be found during the era of Arab nationalism, 
specifically under the reign of its most illustrative figure, President Gammal Abdel 
Nasser of Egypt.  
In 1950’s Cairo, Egypt, a man named Sayyid Qutb traveled to the US out of a 
desire to learn more about its customs, culture, and lifestyle. Coincidentally he happened 
to be tacitly escaping Egyptian authorities upset with his religious rhetoric and “anti-
Egyptian” attitudes as evidenced by his extreme dislike of then President Nasser. 
Nasser’s regime ran numerous prisons that were infamous for their human rights abuses, 
and more often than it was conservative Islamic men like Qutb who were placed in them. 
The prison conditions created such a visceral desire for revenge that some have referred 
to them as the birthplace of 9/11.40 Nevertheless, Qutb received a western education, 	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traveled from the East Coast to the Midwest, and came back to Egypt more hard-line and 
religious from the experience. Disappointed by the US’s lack of religious custom, its 
sexual openness, and spurned by some of the bigotry he faced as man of color, Qutb 
traveled back to Egypt and began writing. One of Qutb’s most notable contemporary 
adherents is Ayman al-Zawhiri, who is the current head of Al-Qaeda and along with 
Osama bin Laden founded the infamous group. One of Zawahiri’s closest friends, Jamal 
Khalifa, would later say, “We read Qutb. He was the one who most affected our 
generation.”41 
While realizing the effects of the writings and life of Sayyid Qutb are important, 
there is no understanding Salafist terror, let alone its roots, without first understanding the 
Afghanistan Civil War in the 1980’s. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to 
assist its communist allies, the bulk of whom were located in the capital Kabul. At that 
time the US, along with several Arab allies, and Pakistan, funded covert Mujahedeen 
groups so that they could fight a guerilla war against both the Soviet Union and the 
Afghan Communists. These groups would form the backbone of the Salafist movement 
of the 1990’s. The strategic thinking that guided the US was indicative of the Cold War, 
as they believed anything, even religious fanatics, would be better suited to rule than the 
Afghan Communists, regardless of the consequences. Arab states, especially Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, established recruiting depots to send young men off to 
fight the “Soviet Jihad” as it was openly called at the time.42 In effect this meant stirring a 
religious pot that exists to this day. The Soviet foreigners were labeled infidels who were 	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ransacking Muslim land, and massive religious galvanization was the only thing that 
could thwart them. 
When the original Afghanistan Civil War came to an end in 1989 many of these 
young men traveled back to their respective countries with their newfound and battle 
tested skills. For the most part these young warrior types were either ignored or cast a 
passive form of shame by their host country societies. Yet the situation did not entirely 
deescalate. Beyond a tumultuous domestic scenario in Yemen and an unrelated conflict in 
Israel-Palestine, domestically the Middle East was not very violent as of 1990. It was not 
until the US invasion of Iraq in 1991 that the landscape began to change, and where this 
project will begin.  
Chapter 8: Interest Sharing  
In order for interest sharing to occur several factors must come in to play. Each of 
these will be discussed in depth and be followed by the primary case study scenarios in 
some detail. At the most basic for interest sharing to occur is the desire to unify in the 
first place. If there is an absence of a common general goal then one could expect no need 
to unify at all. These goals need not always be exactly same, and as will be shown later in 
the project different circumstances in different countries still caused interest sharing to 
occur. Also, interest sharing requires the ability for groups to communicate rapidly and 
efficiently. This may come through media appearances, Internet communication, or 
telephone usage.  
Technology and Media 
 Technology is a major accelerant of terror group interest sharing. It is not a 
coincidence that Al-Qaeda’s and Salafist terror rise largely accompanies the period of 
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vast technological growth that has occurred in the last 20 years around the world. 
Unsurprisingly this rise overlaps with NGO growth as well. Bach and Stark specifically 
mention technology as part of “a constellation of factors that are used to explain the 
recent growth and prominence of NGO’s....”43 The exact same description can be said of 
any terror group, who in the course of the same period of time have become increasingly 
networked. The reason lies in the nature of terror group’s strategy. Salafist terror groups 
feed off of the ability to quickly communicate with one another for various reasons. Chief 
among them are the ability to access worldwide recruits and strategize efficiently behind 
closed doors. As Prieto notes, “Revolutionary changes in mobile and Internet 
technologies over the last decade have given terrorists new capabilities by reducing the 
costs and increasing the reach of their communications.”44 That reduced cost and rapid 
communication is certainly one factor allowing Al-Qaeda to expand its interests, 
especially across the borders of the Middle East and beyond.  
One can witness technology’s force on interest sharing during the run up and 
course of the Iraq War. Prior to the war, Salafist terror groups had created their own 
online forums, magazines, and chat rooms to justify attacking the US and religious 
minorities to disparate teenagers and young adults. While crude and rudimentary, these 
forums are still incredibly important to Salafist groups. The Iraq War made it possible for 
those forums to have more of an international, as opposed to local or regional, appeal. As 
early as the fall of 2002 Al-Qaeda’s central leadership was utilizing the war for 	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propaganda effects.45 This is roughly around the same period of time that the Bush 
Administration began making its private case for the war by dispatching media leaks 
according to journalist Bob Woodward in the book Bush At War.46 Meaning that Salafist 
terror groups are aware of the content of Western media, can spin it for their own 
purposes, and organize on the Internet without having to meet in person in response to 
said content.  
Potentially, utilizing technology can make discussions and organizing easier as 
Salafist terror groups do not have to meet face to face and risk the danger of being killed 
or captured. If need be they can enter battle zones like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Algeria on an 
individual initiative instead of in lazy group clusters. One may think that in largely 
downtrodden combat zones like Iraq and Afghanistan that this could not occur as Salafist 
terrorists could not get their hands on expensive technological material. Such ideas are 
mistaken, as Iraq has a higher number of mobile subscriptions than Qatar, Lebanon, or 
Turkey.47   
 Correlated with the importance of technology to interest sharing is media. Had 
technology and media appearance at least not nominally mattered to Al-Qaeda and 
Osama Bin Laden, one would have expected the 1997 CNN led interview with him to 
never happened.48 Bin Laden could have easily killed the two journalists Peter Arnett and 
Peter Bergen interviewing him, gained some notoriety, and the rest would have been 	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history. However, he chose not to and established contact via his “media advisor” in 
order to pre-screen the questions he would be asked. Bin Laden was using media to get 
his message out internationally, most likely to young minds across the world. That is a 
strategy roughly akin to one adopted by all murderous tyrants in the course of a war or 
conflict (think Bashar Assad’s interview with Charlie Rose). Salafist terrorists may also 
utilize media to their advantage in an effort to inflate their threat, thereby demonstrating 
prowess. As Thomas describes: 
“Terrorists can thus introduce false information into a net via routine means, measure the response it 
garners from the US intelligence community, and then try to figure out where the leaks are in their systems 
or what type of technology the United States is using to uncover their plans”49 
 
 The use of the Internet and media can then become a weapon for Salafist terrorists to 
discover holes in US intelligence. The best means by which Salafist terrorists can 
discover whether or not a threat was communicated successfully is too simply pay 
attention to American media, where terror threats, especially from Muslims, are often 
provided prima facie attention. That drive for “sensational content” led Cvrtila and 
Peresin to conclude the media “guarantees terrorist organizations maximum presence in 
the media…”50 It is therefore clear that the media appearance, whether four years prior to 
the September 11th attacks or even currently, means a great deal to Al-Qaeda and Salafist 
terrorists.  
 Technology and the media should not be thought of as a means to the end of 
interest sharing. It is primarily an accelerating force that reduces the costs of 	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communication and increases the likelihood of a larger terror goal, centralization. 
Throughout the 1990’s and up until today this is the policy that would drive Bin Laden 
and other Salafist terror leaders.  
Centralization 
In a 2011 Middle East demographics report Credit Suisse claimed, “citizens who 
are not politically and economically engaged in terms of GDP, education, employment, 
and income distribution, quality of life and freedom, may be a source of tension and 
unrest.”51 In short, those members of society who are least engaged, whether by force or 
by personal decision, might end up the most “radicalized.” It is no secret that the majority 
of those disengaged members of society tends to be male youth, especially given that the 
Middle East experiences the worst youth unemployment numbers compared to any other 
region. These economic factors should not be construed as lending credence to the 
poverty explanation for terrorism, It is not simply that joining a terrorist organization 
gives those youth, who become the foot soldiers for Salafist terror groups, some 
monetary salary and a way to cover rent. Rather it gives those individuals something to 
do and a way to express their grievances, whatever they may be. Like many of the NGO 
groups founded in the 1990’s, Salafist terrorists are not interested in profit; they are 
interested in what Bach and Stark call “normative values.”52 Salafist terrorists are 
generally able to sell these normative values as a form of religious extremism that gives 
them the means to fight back. Disenchanted with the state, with employers, with other 	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ideologies like nationalism, and with their families, they will wind up joining the last 
shroud of their identity left unperturbed from the outside, their religion. At least that is 
the way Salafist propagandists advertise it. Thus, Salafist terrorists in the Middle East are 
almost exclusively young and male, angry at their society, and are preyed on by religious 
demagogues.  
That lackluster economic performance combined with the lack of something to do 
presents a highly exploitable situation for terrorists architects. One can see evidence of 
this in the formative years of Al-Qaeda and Salafist terror in the 1990’s. The Saudi 
decision to use American military forces as opposed to Mujahedeen forces in the Gulf 
War inspired Bin Laden to take action. The classic example of Salafist terror interest 
sharing is Bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of war on the United States. The very nature of 
the document stresses interest sharing as it is written to the “Muslim brothers across the 
world.” In the declaration Bin Laden highlighted the necessity of confronting the “far 
enemy,” the United States, as opposed to the “near enemy” of corrupt Arab regimes.53 
His aim was political. He wanted to organize the various Islamist groups combating those 
regimes across the Middle East into one cohesive unit against the United States. This is 
the exact definition of NGO centralization, which is “the process by which independent 
but similarly minded NGO’s establish formal decision making structures at the 
international level.”  The Al-Qaeda logic was that if the US fell then so would those same 
Arab regimes that Salafist terrorists had been combating for the past six years or so. 
There is some indication that Bin Laden was successful in this regard, as nearly 10,000 or 
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so young men were thought to have entered his training camps in Afghanistan at one 
point or another throughout the 1990’s.54  
Overall centralization was difficult for Salafists in the 1990’s though. The process 
requires a consensual level of authority secession. Stroup and Wong argue, “many 
NGO’s are actually groups of national level organizations that choose to cede varying 
levels of authority to international arrangements.”55 This is quite literally what Al-Qaeda 
attempted throughout that decade. There were some successes, notably when Bin Laden 
persuaded Zawahiri and his Egyptian Islamic Jihad group to join forces with him in 
Afghanistan. The struggles came via many of the various Salafist groups, most relegated 
to one country, finding any need to unify in the first place. According to Farrall, up until 
the time of Bin Laden’s infamous declaration of war he had failed miserably at 
consolidating power by attempting to pay off like-minded groups with his vast financial 
resources. Of particular importance is his 1993 decision to send approximately $40,000 to 
the Salafist terrorists in Algeria.56 Those groups really had no interest in Bin Laden’s goal 
of attacking the US, but they were certainly happy to take his money. Regardless it is 
indicative of Al-Qaeda’s early attempts at promoting group cohesion.  
The Al-Qaeda message also did not resonate much with the broader Arab public. 
A case can be seen in those countries that did not experience much terrorism in the 
1990’s. Hardly any Salafist terror occurred in Iraq or Libya. In the case of the former 
what Salafist terror did occur was mostly against Kurds, as opposed to against Saddam 
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Hussein and his authoritarian forces. Despite that there was plenty of Salafist terror 
activity in Egypt and Algeria, as they accounted for the vast majority of attacks in the 
pre-9/11 era. Bin Laden was known publically for his hated of Hussein, and Hussein was 
known publically known for feeling likewise, but still very limited attacks occurred, 
certainly none by Al-Qaeda. That is not to say Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda did not try, 
offering large sums of cash to anti-Kurdish Salafists. The major attack discrepancy 
occurred largely because in countries like Libya and Iraq Salafists could not broaden their 
appeal, whereas in Egypt and Algeria they could. The crime in Algeria was obvious; the 
overthrow of a democratically elected Islamist government by the military spurned an 
atrocious decade long civil war. In Egypt, though subtler, roughly the same crime 
occurred over a period of decades beginning with the establishment of that country’s 
republic in the 1950’s. Both of these scenarios are emblematic of governments who shed 
their legitimacy and transferred plenty of interests in favor of Salafist terrorists.  
One can see issue with the blowback theory of increasing terrorism. Throughout 
the Gulf War very little terrorism occurred. The issue a two pronged one; first no Salafist 
group could actually shroud their reasons for a war with Hussein or US Forces in 
religious terms. With the reasons of the war quite well laid out by Hussein, the US, and 
the UN, that line of propaganda could not have existed. Hussein was quite explicit that he 
invaded Kuwait for its oil reserves and access to shipping lanes. Though he offered some 
nationalist justifications, such as the belief that Kuwait was always an Iraqi entity, these 
were not religious ones.57 Second, for many Sunni Arabs, Hussein’s regime had a certain 
marker of legitimacy to it. Jobs, education, and a sense of power come from the Iraqi 	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state, so why attack it? Omar Abdel Rahman, known as the “Blind Sheik,” could actually 
best sum up the line of thinking guiding Salafist terrorists at the time when he said, “both 
those who are against and the ones who are with Iraq should be killed.58” Such logic 
would not exactly garner much support because it would require significant inter-
religious violence and immediate chaos. Coworkers and fellow soldiers would be forced 
to attack one another if they followed strict Salafist thinking at the time, not exactly a 
great selling point for joining a terrorist group. Further, it would require fighting back 
against something that had at least nominal appeal amongst the Iraqi people.  
The Wars 
With the exception of the inter-state conflict that was the Gulf War, the wars in 
the Middle East have been insurgency conflicts. Insurgency conflict is different because 
it “implicates civilians more directly in the process of warfare than conventional forms of 
warfare,” according to Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas.59 Thus, one can expect 
significantly more civilian casualties and in turn making the situation ripe for terror 
exploitation. If the state does not protect you or your family from the intervening force 
then it is likely that an incentive for joining terrorist ranks has presented itself. This is 
certainly the case as Afghanistan has experienced nearly 21,000 civilian casualties and 
Iraq 133,000.60 Both numbers dwarf that of the Gulf War, and those are the more 
conservative estimates. Once again, Algeria is rather murky, with estimates ranging from 	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150,000-200,000 civilians dead.61 However, in each case the Salafist terror group would 
find particular societal holes to adapt to their favor, steal legitimacy from the government, 
and swell their ranks.  
Afghanistan  
Colloquially known as the “good war,” especially after the Iraq War started going 
south, the War in Afghanistan was never given much thought in terms of its negative 
effects on Salafist terrorism until after the Iraq War ended. This is a mistake. As has been 
shown, with the exception of the first two years of fighting in Afghanistan, Salafist 
terrorism would increase significantly every year thereafter. Also, in terms of specific 
Salafist attacks, Afghanistan dominated Iraq with 2,266 in the 20-year period compared 
to Iraq’s 900.62 Unlike the Iraq War, the War in Afghanistan was actually going well for 
the US though. So how did the country go from 71 Salafist terrorist attacks in 2004 to 
530 in 2010? The answer largely lies in the conduct of the war. After routine bombing 
operations by the US, the Taliban were largely decimated after one month of fighting in 
November of 2001. By December 2001 then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
actually declared that major combat operations were over.63 The remnants of Al-Qaeda, 
including Bin Laden, were largely scattered into Pakistan or killed, and the most pressing 
question for the Bush Administration was how the UN would govern the future 
“democratic” State of Afghanistan. 	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 Even with the introduction of US ground forces later on in 2001 and early 2002 
terrorism would not encounter a major spike, another notion that runs somewhat counter 
to the blowback theory. It is likely that in the beginning the majority of Afghans simply 
did not know what was occurring. This is especially possible for those living in the 
countryside outside of Kabul, which is the majority of the population. In Anand Gopal’s 
investigative book No Good Men Among the Living, he reports that some of the people 
believed the newly introduced and generally white American soldiers were just leftover 
Soviet troops.64 Many had not even heard of the September 11th attacks. In such an 
unknowing social climate it would have been near impossible for a terror group to 
galvanize support for their actions. As far as the majority of people knew there was 
nothing to take action against and those who knew the Taliban were not exactly giving 
rave reviews. In turn meaning that the latter half of the war (2006-present) increase in 
Taliban attacks cannot attribute itself to some long lost urgency for Taliban control by the 
majority of Pashtuns. For if that were the case one would expect instantaneous retaliation 
the moment the US forces entered Afghanistan on their behalf. Instead many Taliban foot 
soldiers and their Al-Qaeda supporters who were not dead fled, deserted, or surrendered.  
Over time the situation for the US and in Afghanistan would vastly change. It is 
imperative to remember that by far the majority of Salafist terror attacks in Afghanistan 
occur at the behest of either the Taliban or Haqqani Network as opposed to Al-Qaeda, 
unlike in the rest of the Middle East. The difference is important, as it makes interest 
sharing in Afghanistan somewhat of its own case. The Taliban and Haqqani Network are 
largely comprised of the Pashtun ethnicity, which make up about 42% of Afghanistan’s 	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overall population.65 By contrast, Al-Qaeda’s members are almost exclusively Arab and 
have no ties by birth or tribe to Afghanistan. This gives the Taliban a much bigger edge 
to recruit members and over the years has led to a very limited Al-Qaeda role. Even in 
January of 2011, when terror attacks in Afghanistan were increasing, the US Regional 
Commander based in Kandahar reported virtually no Al-Qaeda presence.66 Though this is 
a simplistic way to look at Afghanistan’s demographics, it does provide a rudimentary 
sense of the importance of identity. It is also exactly why in the early years of War in 
Afghanistan the Bush Administration was adamant about not having the Northern 
Alliance, a warlord group comprised of ethnic minorities the Tajiks and Uzbeks, take the 
capital, Kabul.67 The Bush Administration wisely presupposed that doing so would 
alienate Pashtuns and cause them to join the Taliban.  
It is amazing how accurate that prediction, given in a late 2001 National Security 
Council meeting prior to the war, proved correct. Equally astounding is that the US did 
not heed its own advice. Future US over-reliance on the Northern Alliance, specifically 
the Panjshiri ethnicity, would contribute to a Pashtun led backlash that resurrected the 
Taliban by late 2004.68 Coburn notes that many in Afghanistan felt that the Panjshiri’s 
were responsible for the inordinate amounts of corruption that took place in then 
President Hamid Karzai’s government. While the blame cannot be placed squarely on 
one ethnicity, there is certainly evidence of the Afghan government’s intransigence. The 
Afghan government is notorious for squandering money, corruption, and crime. This 
should not come as an entire surprise. After all, Cottey described, “The record of the 	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Northern Alliance on human rights…was little better than that of the Taliban.”69 Sadly 
that is not even the worst of it. Some cases broach on the bizarre. In one notorious 
incident at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Jackson, soldiers of the Afghan Military were 
keeping prisoner various townspeople under the noses of the Marines at that base.70 On 
its surface that does not seem like a terrible incident, but the people were largely 
barricaded in a room with no light about the size of a closet. The Afghan soldiers had no 
reasoning for keeping the people prisoner; they either did not like them or one of them 
had an issue with another’s tribe. In such a climate one can see how quickly support for 
anything but the government could develop, even support for the Taliban. Incidents like 
this are the reason why Gopal claims, “in the face of perpetual instability, with a weak or 
absent state, you allied with those you knew and trusted.”71 More often than not those 
feeling the brunt of problems were Pashtun, and they knew and trusted the Taliban.  
The incident at FOB Jackson is far from an outlier. It is actually a microcosm of 
an endemic scenario that has plagued Afghanistan’s government and civic society. In his 
embedded memoir No Worse Enemy, journalist Ben Anderson estimated that 90% of the 
crime in Afghanistan was committed by someone in or representing the then Karzai 
government.72 More often than not this was the local police or newly established Afghan 
military, the two organizations that interact with Afghans on an almost daily basis. The 
Afghan troops or police will often cajole themselves into various tribal disputes for their 	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own personal, or even tribal, gain. No doubt this leads to significantly higher levels of 
violence and trauma.  
One may draw the conclusion that had the Afghan government been more open; 
less corrupt, and more pluralistic it may have worked. That goes back to the democratic 
deficit argument addressed in the “Alternative Theories Section.” It is a mistaken 
conclusion however. The problem with the Afghan government established by the US is 
not that it was not democratic enough; rather it is that the government lacks any 
legitimacy amongst the people, especially Pashtuns. The importance of legitimacy in 
regards to terrorism cannot be understated. A 2008 Rand Corporation study noted, “The 
decline of a regime’s legitimacy… can threaten long term stability.”73 By 2004, when the 
US mission there altered, this was certainly the case in Afghanistan. The Afghan 
government, and somewhat the US, lost their legitimacy by over relying on ethnic 
minorities, carrying out the trite yet violent bidding of various warlords, and by centering 
all political importance in one urban center. The Afghan government could be highly 
authoritarian, even violent, but if it had legitimacy it would most likely not face much in 
the way of a terror threat. Indeed that is the position Afghanistan had in the 1990’s. Prior 
to the war’s launching in October of 2001Afghanistan encountered a total of 25 Salafist 
terror attacks in the 20-year period; this despite the fact that the genocidal Taliban were 
in power for half of that time.  
With Afghanistan as an example, it is safe to say that the lack of legitimacy for a 
government can definitely be a benefactor for interest sharing. This is especially when 
one considers the funding of various warlords, where Coburn concludes that, 	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“international military forces and NGO’s will continue to inequitably distribute funds, 
empower warlords, and delegitimize the Karzai government.” After all if a large subset 
group of society, such as the Pashtuns, feel their government is atrocious, that they 
cannot alter it, and the heart of violence is a constant, it may inspire them to take up arms. 
In general this lack of legitimacy effect on interest sharing has the ability to produce 
more societal grievances, which in turn could lead to increasingly marginalized sectors of 
society clustering in anger. It is no wonder then that LaFree and Ackerman claim, 
“participation in terrorism is often linked to a search for meaning and belonging,” 
essentially a sense of meaning and belonging to their government and society.74  
Iraq 
No event assisted Salafist terror group centralization more so than the Iraq War. 
According to Hegghammer, “Iraq is now considered by far the most important battle 
arena in the fight against the ‘Jewish-Crusader alliance;’”75 the “Jewish-Crusader alliance” 
being the crudely crafted term by Bin Laden to describe his fight against the West. The 
numbers of course are striking. Iraq would go from two Salafist terror attacks in 2002 to 
10 in 2003 (the year of the invasion), eventually to 91 in 2004. Representing a near 
4500% increase in just two years. Some of this comes from the nature of military 
interventions. As American troops entered Iraq they became targets for the already active 
Salafist terror cells before the invasion. These groups no doubt took advantage of the fact 
that the “far enemy” had become ever more close. However, this does not explain why 
the attacks grew so precipitously in such a short period of time. It would also not explain 
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why Salafist attack reverberated outside of Iraq where according to Bergen “the rate of 
fatal terror attacks around the world… increased dramatically after the invasion of 
Iraq.”76  
Part of the problem of the Iraq War was the political climate surrounding it. 
Salafist terror groups were undoubtedly able to exploit the negative worldwide 
perceptions of the US following its decision to invade. In France alone, a natural ally of 
the US, US favorability encountered a 20% decline in just one year. In Jordan, the only 
Arab country polled, US favorability declined from 25% to 1% in the period 2002-2003. 
Yet this does not explain Salafist group membership and attack capability. Millions 
across the world, even in the Middle East, opposed the Iraq War yet did not turn their 
resistance into violence. The difference is that the Iraq War, according to Byman, 
vindicated Bin Laden’s argument that the US was the primary enemy of the Muslim 
world.77 Prior to the war Bin Laden’s argument found little resonance in the Middle East, 
this is why attacks in large numbers were relegated to Egypt and Algeria against local 
dictatorships.  
Policies the US adopted whilst in Iraq, namely “de-Baathification,” did not 
exactly assist either. Adopted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its head 
L. Paul Bremer after the April 2003 overthrow of Hussein, “de-Baathification” is largely 
the process by which all members of Saddam Hussein’s former political party were 
barred from taking part in future Iraqi politics. Unsurprisingly the vast majority of 
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Baathist party members were Sunni Muslims. This means that the vast majority of 
recently terminated employees were Sunni Muslims, and that they were barred from 
finding future employment or means of subsistence.  Ruining the very “engagement” that 
Credit Suisse discussed in their report. In terms of the Iraqi military this decision had 
especially poisonous consequences. Thousands of men, young and old, whose only 
training was in the handling of weapons, were instantly prevented from seeking 
employment or opportunity in the future Iraqi state. This disastrous policy occurred 
despite the fact that the US Military was opposed to disbanding the Iraqi Military. Thus 
LaFree and Ackerman’s conclusion that “for Jihadist-style terrorism there is a widespread 
fear that military training increases, rather than diminishes participation in terrorism,” is 
quite salient.78 Many of the individuals who would become Salafist terrorists in Iraq were 
in fact ex-Baathist soldiers. So as opposed to Afghanistan’s ethnically inspired interest 
sharing, religious inspired interest sharing would come to dominate in Iraq. The root 
causes are essentially the same, albeit for slightly different circumstances.  
Algeria/Yemen/Egypt 
The reasons for the Algerian Salafist increase are quite bizarre and dispel the 
notion that it is solely the West that increases Salafist terrorism. In 1992 an Algerian 
Islamist party was expected to win in the nations first democratic elections. Determined 
not to have this be the case, the Algerian military overthrew the Islamist party, banned 
them, and undertook a major violent crackdown. The Algerian military strategy was 
similar to that of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait; they tortured, assassinated, and broke down 
their enemies through a systematic campaign of violence and fear. Yet their war lasted 	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ten years from 1992-2002, as opposed to Iraq’s that lasted seven months. The extended 
period of time allowed more opportunity for terrorist groups to coalesce and organize, 
especially in light of the election that was stolen from them. This largely fits Crenshaw’s 
pattern whereby “Government use of unexpected and unusual force in response to protest 
or reform attempts often compels terrorist retaliation.” 79 
The Salafists in Algeria did not arise overnight from some long dormant 
underground political bloc. Instead as Lowi determines, the nearly 5 or so opposition 
groups in Algeria all stemmed from the forced disintegration of the victorious political 
party of the 1992 election, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).80 While lacking a coherent 
political vision these groups were able to nominally congregate around the banner of the 
Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA). According to Wohl the groups did so in order to 
“unify the diverse interests against the incumbent (military) government,” a clear 
indicator of interest sharing that NGO’s adopt as well.81  
Egypt is somewhat of an interesting case. Unlike all of the countries in Graph 1, 
Egypt never experienced a direct or indirect intervention. Neither the “target rich” 
environment nor the Choi-Powers troop level medium could be seen as exploitable by 
Egypt’s Salafist terrorists (both are items discussed later). Neither can responses to the 
hazardous use of indirect force by a western power explain the 1990’s spike in Salafist 
terrorism. Though the Mubarak regime at the time may have utilized a heavy-handed 
police force, this is not entirely comparable to the use of military troops, such as in 	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Algeria. Instead it is likely that Egypt’s Salafists, unlike those in other states of the 
Middle East, had been forged by years of waning legitimacy of the Egyptian Republic’s 
leaders.  This process most likely began in the 1950’s, with the Nasser regimes led 
crackdown of Islamic political parties discussed briefly in the “History” section. The 
1979 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt certainly dealt a further blow to 
Egypt’s legitimacy. Even today nearly 61% of Egyptian oppose that treaty, creating an 
exploitable situation for terrorists.82 The final blow may have come with the suppression 
tactics in the 1980’s, whereby all members of opposition, but mainly Islamic parties, 
were arrested, tortured, or killed. It is likely that these policy decisions by Egypt 
culminated in the major Salafist terror attacks of the 1990’s.  
Curiously, Yemen mirrors some of the same problems of Afghanistan. It is well 
known that former President Ali Abdullah Saleh utilized Al-Qaeda militants in order to 
assist his fight in that country’s Civil War against Marxists and secessionists of the 
1990’s. Despite this, the US provided lucrative aid money and military assistance to 
Saleh’s regime well into his eventual departure in 2011. How much of that aid money 
ended in Al-Qaeda hands is impossible to determine; but it can be said unequivocally that 
at least some of it did. According to a former Yemeni Salafist quoted in Foreign Policy, 
“the members of Al-Qaeda who refused to be paid, they are the people Saleh told the 
Americans to kill.” It is a common tactic for an authoritarian to use to his advantage a 
hair trigger American policy for his own domestic gains, and certainly not one limited to 
Afghanistan.  
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Backfiring  
Interest sharing is not a one-way street that only results in gains for terror groups. 
Even for terror groups like Al-Qaeda interest sharing is a double-edged sword. In 1997 
Salafist terrorists from the al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (GAI) committed the “Luxor 
Massacre,” killing around 59 civilians and a few Egyptian policemen. To this day the 
attack is one of Egypt’s deadliest. Yet it backfired on the group by turning normal 
Egyptians and Arabs against its wanton brutality. Shocked and horrified by the image of 
massacred civilians, GAI would encounter a passive resistance that stifled its operations. 
The results in Egypt are quite striking. In less than two years Egypt was able to achieve 
what 6 years of counter terror measures could not; be attacked by Salafist’s zero times in 
one calendar year. It would take nearly 6 years for Egypt to experience another Salafist 
attack, which can probably be attributed to the Iraq War instead. In 2005 Amman, Jordan 
would experience a similar atrocity when militants associated with Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi, the head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, attacked hotels killing nearly 60 civilians. The 
results were numerous public demonstrations against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda and a 
decline in the popularity of Bin Laden by 40%.83 The attack happened so early in the Iraq 
War that Salafist attacks in Jordan, Iraq’s neighbor, would be quite low throughout the 
entirety of the conflict.  
Though it remains somewhat of a theory, there is scant evidence that Algeria’s 
Intelligence Service, the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS), utilized 
backfiring interest sharing against its Salafist enemies in their civil war. The goal was to 
provide the GIA with some support so they would break away from the other Salafist 
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groups, provoke massive hostility, and eventually discredit the opposition. The results, 
though horrific, were somewhat successful. Even Bin Laden would purportedly “recoil” 
from the violence of the Algerian Civil War, causing him to break ties with Salafist 
Islamist group in 1997, a year after his declaration of war against the US. The support for 
backfiring interest sharing need not be entirely direct. According to one survivor of the 
infamous Bentalha Massacre, which killed around 200 individuals, the Algerian military 
was notably absent from the area the day of the attack despite a normally massive 
presence. Amnesty International lends credence to Algerian Military culpability in a 1997 
report citing “military troops with armored vehicles were stationed a few hundred meters 
away as the massacre was taking place.”84 For the Algerian Military the massacre was a 
means by which the opposition could discredit itself with the slaughter of hundreds of 
innocent civilians.  
According to Graph 2 1997 was the second highest year for Salafist terror attacks 
in Algeria. Though the violence would slightly increase and plateau at certain points the 
attacks would never be as violent as in that particular year, where some of the most 
infamous massacres occurred. Not coincidentally the GIA would lose its foreign and 
domestic “coalition,” break into smaller less powerful groups, and become largely 
ineffective at combating the state. While terrorism continued in Algeria after the civil war 
ended in 2002, most of those attacks were quite small scale. For example, 2004 
experienced 41 incidents with 119 deaths, or 2.9 deaths per attack.85 On the other hand in 
the same year Iraq experienced 91 incidents with 625 deaths, or 6.9 deaths per attack.  
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Graph 2 
 
Herein lays an inherent paradox for terror groups; utilize too little force and your 
group could be cast off as irrelevant or weak, but use too much force against the 
population that makes your base, and you will have difficulty recruiting. That rings true 
especially in situations outside of direct interventions, as was the case in Egypt in the 
1990’s. For a better picture of what that means consider a reverse example. If the US 
Military were to bombard a Dallas suburb in order to root out a grouping of Salafist 
terrorists, you could expect both future enlistees and military support to dwindle 
significantly.  
Global  
Though it does not exactly fall within the bounds of this project, one can see 
interest sharing outside of the Middle East too. By launching the GWOT, the US granted 
a sort of de facto recognition to the international community that “terrorism,” however 
they defined it, must be stopped at all costs. In regards to Russia and China, both with 
large Muslim populations, it has created many problems. Certainly US approval of their 
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actions made combating Salafist terrorism more difficult as tacit support is granted to 
many human rights abusers. Scheuer even goes as far to label China’s actions in the 
restive Xinjiang Province, where most of its Muslim population resides, “genocidal.”86 
No doubt this has had the double effect of creating more terrorists and lending credence 
to Bin Laden’s theories of global struggle.  
Chapter 8: Blowback 
 
 Military interventions as a source of terror have been studied quite rigorously. 
Choi demonstrates that direct military interventions can fuel terror attacks and group 
popularity in some capacity.87 Kydd and Walter show that certain strategies of terrorists, 
such as outbidding and provocation, are quite salient for terror groups when it comes to 
combating direct interventions also.88 In Pape’s study, he supports the notion that 
occupations of countries by military forces, regardless of where they occur, almost 
inevitably lead to the employment of suicide terrorism. With the exception of Choi, these 
studies ignore a key element; not all direct interventions are created equal. Americans of 
baby boomer age would be quick to remember that the Gulf War and Iraq War were 
entirely different not only in outcome but in operation as well. The same can also be said 
of the differences between the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Also of importance is that not 
all direct interventions need to be taken at the behest of the US or a Western power, 
something none of the studies examined in this project looked at. Algeria’s brutal civil 
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war in the 1990’s qualifies as for a direct intervention, and therefore will be analyzed 
with the Gulf War, War in Afghanistan, and Iraq War.   
 Certainly a positive correlation exists to support the idea that direct military 
intervention increases terrorism. After all a look at Graph 3 demonstrates that terrorism of 
all sorts, not just Salafist, grew precipitously in the Middle East in the 20-year period at 
certain key intervals. The first prominent example is 1992, which is the start of the 
Algerian Civil War. The second comes after October 8th, 2001, the day the GWOT was 
officially declared and the US began attacking Afghanistan. Yet the most dramatic rise in 
terrorism seems more in line with the beginning of the Iraq War in March of 2003. Much 
of this is largely vindicating already known information about terrorism. The DOD’s 
Defense Science Board in a 2004 report doubled down and specified their 1997 
conclusion by claiming, “Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather they hate our 
policies.” Our policies being “direct intervention,” mentioned specifically in the report.89 
Eland concurs, describing Bin Laden as almost exclusively using US policies as his 
rallying call.90 However, this does not get into explaining what it is about direct 
interventions that are responsible for terror increases. To start the paper will analyze the 
American led instances of direct intervention, then proceeds to the Algerian case. 
Following that a brief analysis of indirect intervention tactics will be discussed.  
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Graph 3 
 
 
US Led Direct Interventions 
Gulf War 
Undertaken under the auspices of removing Saddam Hussein’s aggressive Iraqi 
military from Kuwait, the Gulf War did not last very long. As far as the United States is 
concerned the direct intervention portion of the war only lasted from January 17, 1991 
until February 27, 1991, with Hussein’s invasion and eventual occupation of Kuwait 
taking place in August of 1990.91 The conflict ended rather quickly and inauspiciously, 
and because of the mandate secured by the US via United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 678 the US was not viewed by the bulk of the international community as the 	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aggressor.92  That element is key, many Sunni Arabs in the Middle East may have 
opposed the war, as Saddam Hussein was relatively well liked by them, but with 
international support it would be difficult for terrorists to propagandize the US as an 
international bad guy.  
During the course of the war there were hardly any noteworthy incidents of 
terrorism in the Middle East. The lack of immediate Salafist or other terrorism in the 
Middle East, especially in Iraq and Kuwait where the fighting took place, may lead one to 
conclude that the US led a “clean” campaign, with limited civilian casualties and damage. 
Such an idea is erroneous. The US and its coalition forces not only drove the Iraqi 
military out of Kuwait, but they also bombed parts of military installations in and around 
Baghdad so as to further deter Hussein. This decision by the US incurred heavy Iraqi 
civilian casualties, approximately 3,500 according to Daponte, with another 100,000 
dying from indirect effects of the war in her estimate.93 Concurrently the State 
Department also noted an increase in the number of terror attacks in the Middle East from 
65 to 79 and attributed them to the tensions from the war.94  That report fails to 
encapsulate the full scenario. The PLO in Israel committed the majority of those attacks, 
which falls out of the bounds of this project. It is highly likely that those attacks would 
have occurred regardless of whether or not the Gulf War ever took place. Still neither its 
coalition partners nor US forces faced any Salafist terror threat where actual combat took 
place in Iraq or Kuwait, despite the above-mentioned civilian casualties.  
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What of the record of Saddam Hussein’s forces? They were certainly the 
aggressive force in the Gulf War and were not a religious military. Yet, they faced little 
retaliation in the way of terror too. In fact only two terrorist attacks occurred during the 
entirety of the conflict in Kuwait. The damage inflicted by the two attacks was one 
fatality and one injury respectively, neither of which were directed at Iraqi troops but 
against Kuwait.95 Again the culprit could be assumed to be the PLO, hardly a Salafist 
group. The PLO would have had more incentive to carry out the attacks anyway as they 
openly sided with Saddam Hussein against Kuwait during the Gulf War, a decision that 
later led to their forced exodus from that nation. However even if the two attacks were to 
belong to Salafist groups the damage was so miniscule as to almost devalue them to the 
level of violent street crime as opposed to terrorism. Similarly in Iraq there were no terror 
attacks, not even by Kurdish or Shiite groups. So despite the fact that a direct intervention 
was carried out, at the behest of Western forces, and an act of aggression was carried out 
by the nationalist Iraqi military, there were hardly any terror attacks in response from late 
1990 to early 1991; only three in total that caused three injuries and one fatality.  
Following the end of US combat operations in Iraq, 1991 became a relatively 
calm year. Of the 116 terror attacks following combat operations in late February, only 
26 were Salafist inspired, with a majority of them occurring in Algeria, which will be 
discussed later. The US experienced little in the way of immediate blowback for its 
interests in the region, and the nature of the war meant little time for terror groups to 
organize. That point is key. Primarily the PLO and Hezbollah were responsible for the 
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terrorism that did occur in the Middle East at the time. Both groups were also entrenched 
and organized at the time, meaning they could respond quickly to rapidly changing events.  
A few rudimentary conclusions can be drawn from the Gulf War case. First the 
war was done with one widely accepted goal in mind; get Hussein’s Iraqi military out of 
Kuwait. No time costing endeavors such as democracy promotion or regime change took 
place, which brings up the second point: the short duration of the conflict meant little 
time for terror groups to organize, strategize, and plot. All of which are integral to any 
terror group. The PLO were the only group responsible for terror attacks during the 
conflict for a reason, they were already in place, had battle tested skills from their 
skirmishes in Israel and Palestine, and had the tacit backing of Saddam Hussein. No 
Salafist terrorism occurred because frankly no truly Salafist organizations existed. There 
was not enough time for one to build up in the 40 days of direct intervention by the US 
and 6 months by Iraq. Though Bin Laden declared Al-Qaeda active as early as 1989 the 
group only had around 80 members, was relegated to Afghanistan and far from popular.  
Afghanistan/Iraq Wars 
The US would keep military forces out of direct conflict in the region for another 
10 years, changing policy after the September 11th atrocities. This fit one of Bin Laden’s 
immediate goals. It is well known that Bin Laden’s primordial motive in attacking the US 
on September 11th was to draw the US into a massive over response in Afghanistan, 
thereby galvanizing the world’s Muslims for a counter attack and eventual revolution.96 
In other words, almost exactly the course of events that happened in Afghanistan in the 
1980’s against the Soviets. It is akin to the Crenshaw strategy where terrorism is 	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“intended to provoke a counter-reaction from the government, to increase publicity for 
the terrorists’ cause.”97 Fortunately that not only did not occur, it almost happened in 
reverse order in the early years of the GWOT.  
Interestingly at first the War in Afghanistan did not experience many major issues 
in the way of Salafist terror. There were Salafist terror attacks, but they were quite 
limited, especially given the massive Al-Qaeda and Taliban resistance the US was 
expecting. The limited Salafist terror response can partially attribute itself to the lack of 
targets for those groups to exploit, known as a “target-rich environment.” The target rich 
environment introduces forces for terrorists to attack in a foreign country, meaning they 
do not have to plan for time expensive overseas ventures. This decreases the risk for 
terror groups inherent in trying to plan an operation that spans the globe. In intervention 
terms the wider the target rich the environment, the greater the propensity they will be 
attacked to a degree. US troop deployments in the initial stages of the War in Afghanistan 
were quite limited, keeping that environment low with only 5,200 troops in 2002, 10,400 
in 2003, and 15,200 in 2004.98 For a country with a population of nearly 22 million at the 
time, those troop numbers are quite small. Predictably the War in Afghanistan could be 
regarded as an initial, albeit tacit, success as many of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements 
were thrown out of the country. Speaking in an interview with Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly 
in 2014 former Lt. General Daniel Bolger confirmed this by calling the war largely a 
victory as quickly as early 2002.99  	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Juxtaposed to the 67,700 troops deployed to Iraq in 2003100, the numbers in 
Afghanistan are almost insignificant. Naturally the discrepancy in attack numbers is 
apparent. Whereas Afghanistan would go from 16 Salafist terror attacks to 74 to 71 in 
three years of war, Iraq would go from 10 to 91 to 122 in the same amount of time. By 
2006, the situation in Iraq was so abysmal that the Director of National Intelligence 
concluded that the “Iraq War has become the cause célèbre for Jihadists…” The 
discrepancy in attack numbers may seem slightly arbitrary, but it is important for several 
reasons. As mentioned previously, organization and time are two related goals 
fundamental to all terror groups. In Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were 
entrenched, with the latter even desiring a US response. Given the groups preparedness, it 
is surprising that more terrorism did not occur. In Iraq, there was virtually no Al-Qaeda 
or Salafist terrorism prior to the war. Incidences of suicide terrorism in Iraq were also 
non-existent prior to the war according to Pape.101 In short one can see that the Iraq War 
had the quick effect of galvanizing disparate sectors of society into fighting back the US.  
The Salafist terror response differences are in keeping in line with Powers and 
Choi’s conclusion that “those interventions using either very small or very large troop 
levels…have no influence on terrorisms pervasiveness.”102 This can be referred to as the 
Powers-Choi medium, whereby the medium allotment of troops is enough to inspire 
blowback for a few reasons. Afghanistan certainly fit the mold of small troop levels at 
first at least. While on the other hand, Iraq did not.   	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There is reason to indicate preliminary support for the Powers-Choi conclusion by 
the military brass. A US Central Command (CENTCOM) report concerning a 
hypothetical Iraq War, “Operation Desert Crossing;” a war game commissioned by then 
CENTCOM head General Anthony Zinni in the late 1990’s, opined that for the war to be 
successful it would require around 350,000 troops.103 That was far from an isolated 
opinion. In late 2002 General Eric Shinseki, then the Army Chief of Staff, went even 
further, arguing that the war would require around 500,000 troops to be carried out 
effectively. To juxtapose the Gulf War would utilize around 650,000 troops and has been 
shown did not experience any immediate Salafist terrorism. Though the original 67,700 
troops in Iraq may sound relatively large, it was deliberately kept low by the Bush 
Administration, who largely ignored Desert Crossing and Shinseki’s opinions. With only 
a maximum of 157,800 troops in Iraq ever in one year, the war would predictably fit the 
Powers-Choi medium of troop numbers highly exploitable by terrorists.  
Invading Iraq with the Powers-Choi middle ground, the US would encounter a 
significant quagmire that led to a literal implosion of that country. Within that medium 
scenario in the words of Powers and Choi, once a terror group “attains the requisite 
amount of resources for collective action they are… thus more likely to engage in 
political violence.” Saddam Hussein’s vast weapons depots would supplant the resources 
necessary for collective action in Iraq.  The failure by the US to secure them was a costly 
mistake that led to the Government Accountability Office finding many of those depots 
were looted, with the stolen munitions largely being converted into the dreaded 
improvised explosive devices, or IED’s. That particular weapon would be responsible for 	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approximately 60% of American casualties in the Iraq War and an untold number of Iraqi 
deaths.104 That does not even paint the full picture. During the course of the looting the 
Federation of American Scientists estimates that perhaps thousands of shoulder fired 
surface to air missiles went missing from the weapons depots too. Spread all over the 
world now, these weapons are lethally undetectable and highly dangerous for not only 
terrorism in the Middle East, but for other conflict dominated regions as well. 
With those reports in mind it is no wonder that terrorism increased significantly 
faster in Iraq compared to Afghanistan in the beginning. The Iraq War would also 
provide the inspiration Bin Laden lacked in Afghanistan, thereby spurning the original 
drive to collective action. According to Scheuer, “there is nothing Bin Laden could have 
hoped for more than the American invasion and occupation of Iraq.” It provided the 
exploitable environment he was looking for, a “Christmas gift” of terrorism, to borrow a 
crude yet telling Scheuer quote.105 Once the war began, Salafist terrorism would increase 
throughout the Middle East. That is unlike Afghanistan, which did not inspire Bin 
Laden’s call to arms regionally or globally. These results are due to the lethal 
combination of a conflict situation where enough troops are around to around to bring up 
the requisite target rich environment, yet not enough to enforce some nominal level of 
order such as deterring street crime or looting.  
A bell curve of sorts develops in Iraq once the US begins drawing troops down. In 
first full year of war, 2004, there were 130,600 US troops in Iraq, which coincided with 
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91 Salafist attacks.106 While reaching a high of 160 terror attacks with 135, 600 troops in 
2009, the next year would see Salafist terror dwindle to 95 attacks with only 88,300 
troops in country. This is certainly within the Powers-Choi medium, but it does represent 
a more than nominal decrease in the available target rich environment.  
A look at Graph 4 shows that Salafist terror attacks in the Afghan War would 
eventually surpass those in Iraq in 2005, and be responsible for around 40.4% in the 20-
year period, compared to Iraq’s 16.4%. The discrepancy is partially misleading. In terms 
of overall terrorist attacks Iraq has encountered more than Afghanistan every year since 
2003 and is placed higher on the Global Terrorism Index’s threat ranking. The problem is 
many of the attacks in Iraq cannot be delineated to a specific group or ideology, whereas 
in Afghanistan they can. Regardless both nations sit in the Vision of Humanity’s top 5 
worst states for terrorism, with Afghanistan generally averaging 3rd or 4th place, and Iraq 
always at the unfortunate top.  
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There is good reason to believe that in the end both US led direct interventions 
created more terrorism than they thwarted, especially in the respective countries. Though 
most of the blame must be squared on the decision to invade Iraq, as the situation in 
Afghanistan was nominally improving in the beginning. This is combined with the fact 
the as Eland describes the Iraq War had the effect of increasing collateral damage and 
widening the GWOT to unnecessary aims. Salafists and other terrorists certainly 
responded. One can see as much in general terror data. Prior to 2003 there were only 343 
suicide terror attacks in the world, with around 10% of them directed at the US. 
Following that year up until today there have been nearly 9,000 suicide terror attacks, 
with 91% of them directed at US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.107 Once again the 
suicide attacks present particular salience because though they only account for nearly 
5% of attacks, they make up nearly 50% of the fatalities.  
  Indirect Intervention  
 As the project ends in 2010, indirect intervention analysis is more difficult to 
obtain. In the entire period of the study there were very limited instances of indirect 
intervention tactics, as these became a staple of the Obama Administration primarily after 
2010. Nevertheless, 11 total incidents of indirect intervention occurred in the Middle East 
in the 20-year period; two in Iraq, in 1993 and 1996 respectively, one in Afghanistan in 
1998, and 8 in Yemen at intervening years, the first being in 2002. The cruise missile 
strike in Afghanistan was followed by a year of no terror attacks. The two in Iraq were 
both followed by years of one terror attack each. The incidents in Yemen, utilizing the 
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cheaper and quicker Predator and Reaper Drones, are more telling. Each year drones 
were used in Yemen was followed by an increase in Salafist terror.  
 The data from Iraq do not necessarily produce any definitive conclusions. The 
two terror attacks cannot be said to have definitively arisen from the cruise missile strikes. 
After all, limited Salafist terror was present in Iraq prior to those years anyway, primarily 
against the Kurds. The Afghanistan case is different. It is somewhat misleading to 
conclude that the 1998 Clinton Administration decision to use cruise missile strikes in 
Afghanistan had no negative effects because of the lack Salafist terrorist attacks. First, 
the Taliban were largely in power of the country at the time, so it would make no sense 
for them to attack themselves or their own infrastructure. Second, Al-Qaeda was newly 
introduced to the country, but their new hosts had no reasons to attack them either, 
otherwise they would not have invited them in the first place. Appreciative of their new 
home, Al-Qaeda did not really have any incentive to attack the Taliban too. Evidence 
blowback exists, just in a more discrete form.  This type of blowback cannot be 
quantified but is certainly worth mentioning. According to declassified NSA cables, the 
cruise missile strike had the pernicious effect of drawing the two Salafist organizations 
together.108 The Taliban now saw Al-Qaeda’s fight as their fight, and vice-versa.  
The Taliban spokesmen at the time even went as far as claiming, “If Kandahar 
could have retaliated with similar strikes against Washington, it would have.” Prior to 
that attack the two organizations were only nominal allies, forged more so by 
convenience then by desire. Al-Qaeda needed a safe haven after being kicked out of 
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Sudan in 1996, and ever eager for more guns, the Taliban were not going to deny 
someone willing to fight alongside them. Taliban head Mullah Omar is famous for saying 
Bin Laden was akin to a knife in his neck, something he could neither pull out nor leave 
in. It is likely the Clinton Administrations decision to use a cruise missile strike 
cauterized the wound and healed their bizarre relationship.  
Yemen presents the most interesting case for indirect intervention. This author has 
shown before that a strong correlation exists after 2010 between the number of drone 
strikes in a given year and the number of terrorist attacks. However, that study did not 
delineate Salafist attacks in particular. Remember Yemen has a sizable Shia minority and 
an active Shia terror group, the Houthis. Parallels can be drawn between the Yemeni and 
Pakistani drone programs on the basis that both are undertaken with essentially the same 
strike policies, both the “signature” and “personality” versions mentioned above. In 
Pakistan, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US Sherry Rehman told CNN reporters 
that the drone program there “radicalizes foot soldiers, tribes, and entire villages in our 
region.”109 
There is certain plausibility to these arguments. After all the “signature strike” 
method can have the particularly damaging effect of convincing Sunni Arabs that the US 
is at war with their way of life, since the criterion are based partially off religious 
customs. This is particularly troubling when the US broadens its strike capability. As the 
NYU/Stanford Law School report notes that many of those targeted by the drone program 
were either exceptionally young or proven to be low level fighters. Approximately 90% 
of the “militant” deaths can at least fall into that category. However, many of the Al-	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Qaeda fighters in Yemen were transfers from either Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan. Some 
of these men ma have had ties to Yemen, but it seems that the bulk of them were more 
interested in expanding Al-Qaeda’s reach rather than reacting to situations in Yemen. 
This is at least the case within the 20-year period.  
Statistical Analysis Results 
  To conceptualize the effect that blowback may have on terrorism numerically this 
project ran a negative binomial regression analysis of the data involving terrorists attacks, 
“direct interventions,” and “indirect interventions.” The data were categorized as follows: 
direct interventions were placed in a year and country as the number of troops located in 
said place and time. So for instance, Algeria had approximately 140,000 troops fighting 
the GIA from 1992-2002, so each of those year’s variables was marked with 140,000. 
Indirect interventions were categorized with much lower numbers. The 1998 Afghanistan 
strike would simply count as one for 1998 for example. The results from the negative 
binomial regression can be seen in Table 2.   
Negative Binomial Regression Results Table 2110 
 Coefficient 
Direct .354011 (.0830658) 
Indirect .5449437 (.2298848) 
  
Essentially these coefficient numbers mean for direct interventions is that if you 
increase the number of soldiers in a country by one there is a .354011 increase in the 
incidents of Salafist terrorism. Considering the above-mentioned cases this should not be 
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entirely shocking. For indirect interventions though it means that if one were to increase 
the number of strikes (drone or cruise missile) in a given country by one there is 
a .5449437 increase in the incidents of Salafist terrorism. This evidence is certainly 
striking, but as mentioned previously it does not paint the entire picture. In his book The 
Last Refuge Johnsen describes how after the regime of Ali Salih exploited their services, 
“a number of jihadis wondered why they were being ignored instead of being asked to 
share in governing the country…”111 This proves that 1. Prior to drone program coming 
into existence Yemen had a vast Salafist terror network and 2. Their primary grievance 
was not drones but rather the loss of legitimacy and participation from the Salih 
government. The drones in later years may have exasperated those problems, especially 
after the 20-year period ended. However, because it does not fall within the bounds of 
this project it would make little sense to add those extra years in.   
Chapter 10: Conclusion  
 The evidence provided above can now allow for some conclusions: There is 
evidence to support the claim that direct intervention causes blowback and therefore 
increases Salafist terrorism. At that same point, there is evidence that interest sharing has 
the same effect. So this does not exactly tell one a great deal about what increases Salafist 
terrorism in the Middle East. Instead the two variables should be seen as related to one 
another. Direct intervention can serve as a benefactor for interest sharing, thereby 
increasing the number of terror attacks. The introduction of combat troops in a nation can 
stir up resentment, fear, anger, alienation and other ill feelings. Terrorist leaders will then 
seek to propagandize off of those emotions to best suit the interest of their group. The 	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intervening nation can also exacerbate these feelings if it adopts certain policies that 
alienate the intervened upon population. Speaking in a recent interview, CIA 
whistleblower John Kirikaou said: 
“People make a big deal about ISIS’ social media presence. Yeah, that’s great, they’re very 
sophisticated. But what really helps them recruit is actions by us: where we show disrespect for 
human rights, disrespect for civil liberties, and a propensity to torture people.”112 
 
The direct intervention hypothesis doe not paint the full picture though. Why, in Iraq for 
example, did people not simply join nationalist terror organizations or flock to the Iraqi 
Army en masse to defend their sovereignty? The answer lies in the effect direct 
interventions have on interest sharing. 
 Direct interventions present the primary factor to increase interest sharing. They 
underscore the most necessary piece of interest sharing to begin with, creating a desire to 
unify. The Iraq War, and to a lesser extent the War in Afghanistan, had just that effect. 
The presentation of American troops to the region largely made many of Bin Laden’s 
strange theories about the US plausible in many Muslims minds. Combined with the loss 
of legitimacy of Arab regimes, Al-Qaeda and Salafist terrorists were able to retaliate 
against the US with extreme prejudice by broadening their appeal. Another policy that 
can assist direct intervention and thereby increase interest sharing amongst Salafist terror 
groups is adopting the Powers-Choi troop level medium can create a highly chaotic state 
of affairs inside a country.   
 As far as indirect interventions go there seem to be no support one way or another. 
On one hand is the key discrete form of blowback the 1998 cruise missile strike against 	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Afghanistan had on Taliban-Al-Qaeda relations. But on the other hand is the noticeable 
swell in Al-Qaeda numbers in Yemen prior to the drone programs full implementation. It 
is likely this effect took place in later years too, but the loss of legitimacy combined with 
a deteriorating socio-economic Yemen had more of the effect on Salafist interest sharing 
in that country. The drone program may have just been icing on the cake for the Salafists 
in the Arabian Peninsula and not increased their rise one way or another in the 20-year 
period.  
So it would be a mistake to say that direct and indirect interventions are entirely a 
source of terrorism. Both the Gulf War and early stages of the War in Afghanistan serve 
as indications of that. Though the Gulf War did serve as a later inspiration for Salafist 
terror groups it was not a message that spread too rapidly as the US could never present 
the immediate “target rich environment” and Salafist terrorists could never exploit 
resentment of the US in their favor absent indications that the US was evil in their eyes. 
Instead direct interventions should be thought of as a major force contributing to Salafist 
interest sharing. As was shown in the project, this process waxed and waned by country, 
but overall remained steady.  
Future Research    
Two critical regions this project did not examine were Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia. The latter is often considered the GWOT’s “other” focus zone, while the 
former is a late bloomer in regards to terrorism. Future research should definitely analyze 
Salafist terror in those regions and other forms of political conflict. Furthermore, future 
research should investigate the links between terror group interest sharing and civilian 
deaths, asking how specifically do terrorists exploit them and to what effect. Also of 
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interest to future researchers should be the potential other ways in which blowback can 
arise in conflict situations.  In the future this author would prefer to examine Yemen and 
indirect intervention again, and re-visit some of the past conclusions.  
Chapter 11: Policy Recommendations  
While somewhat different in operation, what can be labeled the Bush and Obama 
Doctrines rely on the belief that terrorists need to be fought there in the Middle East, so 
they do not come here to the US homeland. Both the 2006 and 2011 Strategy to Prevent 
Terror that idea comes up. However as the above information demonstrates our presence 
in the Middle East has actually led to a precipitous increase in the both the size and scale 
of terror attacks by increasing interest sharing. Terrorism will obviously remain a threat, 
so what options should the US and its partners adopt to mitigate it? At the most basic, the 
US should do everything to take away from the interests of terror organizations. The 
2006 National Intelligence Estimate largely concurs, opining, “Countering the spread of 
the Jihadist movement will require coordinated, multilateral efforts that go well beyond 
operations to kill or capture terrorists leaders.”113 Here is how the US can do so: 
 To start, a scaling back of forces is going to have to occur at some point in the 
Middle East. While lawmakers in Washington are quick to point out this or that security 
failure and its lack of troops to preempt it, they rarely if ever seem to acknowledge both 
direct and indirect interventions effects when it comes to increasing terrorism. This 
author has suggested before that closing the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force 
(AUMF), which grants the US legal authority to strike anywhere against terrorists tied to 
the September 11th attacks, would be a wise idea.114 Indeed it still is. That particular 	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AUMF has led the US to consider those who may not like the US terrorists. Curiously it 
has led the US to consider too much voicing of criticism of the US to be considered anti-
Americanism and therefore terrorism. No doubt that has contributed to threat conflation, 
where the US attacks those who might not present any real threat. One can see this in 
Afghanistan specifically, where if a local warlord brandishes another a terrorist it is 
almost impossible for the latter to drop that label. The US can even go further than 
adopting a new strike and military policy though.  
It may be somewhat cliché but the US should focus instead on exhausting all 
options on defending the US, without the use of preemption as an immediate strategy. 
Had US policies to appropriately focus on terrorism in the first place the September 11th 
attacks may not have even happened. Both the NSA and CIA had information on the 9/11 
Al-Qaeda Hamburg Cell but refused to share crucial information with the FBI that could 
have led to many members of that cell’s capture.  That is only one of several lethal 
mistakes. According to Zegart both organizations (the FBI and CIA) missed exactly 23 
opportunities to prevent 9/11 in a time that spans the Clinton and Bush Administrations. 
Meaning that the US could have ensured the attack did not occur without the use of 
Patriot Act, Iraq War, or drone warfare in Yemen. The tools were already in place, office 
politics simply got in the way. It is a paradoxical world where office bureaucracy is just 
as dangerous as groups of angry men with Ak-47’s.  
 Geo-politically there may come a time when the US will have to accept the fact 
that a government in the Middle East may not exactly be on friendly terms with it. The 
Obama Administration has taken some strides in this regard via its newfound relations 
with Iran, but in the rest of the Middle East much of the same policies continue. This is 	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important because it could allow a rudimentary civic society to independently develop. 
The RAND Corporation noted that, “Political opening can co-opt and moderate 
opposition forces and marginalize hardliners…” No doubt there are no guarantees here, 
but it certainly could beneficial for the region in the long run by allowing an organic civil 
society to develop. 
 Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, investigative 
journalist Lawrence Wright commented that in the Middle East “there is nothing between 
the government and the mosque.” Perhaps if something were to fill that void many Arab 
Muslims would not feel so compelled to join Salafist groups. While of course many may 
find solace in political Islam, radical liberalism, radical environmentalism, etc. this 
should not be a cause for fear. Those political organizations with an unfamiliar 
ideological background as their backbone should be perceived as threats only if they 
actually do something threatening. At the end of the day a democratic form of 
government must be developed organically and independently in order to thrive; it cannot 
be created by a whimsically named “Freedom Agenda,” whereby the US plays God 
attempting to immaculately conceive a democracy in a region without one. Every modern 
democracy is the perfect example; they all struggled largely on their own to become the 
way they are today, the US is no exception. Auto-correction is key to the formulation of a 
legitimate government, and the US needs to allow that to happen.  
 None of this should be construed as saying that the US should take irrational 
measures like not engaging terrorists militarily or eliminating the option to utilize 
military force. There will come a time when the US will have to engage another terrorist 
group militarily, perhaps another Salafist one. In that case the US should re-think its 
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global strategy in the Middle East. As Choi describes, the only form of intervention that 
does not incur blowback against terror groups are those that specifically target terrorists 
and do not broaden their goals to regime change or attacking the political structure of 
another state.115 A foreign power will struggle mightily attempting to establish a 
legitimate government in another state, as the Iraq and Afghan wars demonstrate it is an 
almost fruitless endeavor. As such the US would be wise to drop it as a policy goal and 
only engage those terrorists that have demonstrated a threat capability. Doing so will 
require the policy of “offshore balancing,” where heavy emphasis is placed on the use 
and stationing of Naval force. Forces are generally concentrated on naval ship in those 
flash point areas susceptible to conflict that threatens the US. Certainly much more could 
be written on this issue, especially related to terrorism. So it would be best to analyze that 
in future research. 
 Coupled with that new level of engagement should be a goal to avoid the Powers-
Choi medium at all costs. It goes without saying that the resort to force should ultimately 
be a last resort, but if the time comes where maybe a massive direct military intervention 
is required, then by all means operate under the pretense of more is better. Do not 
sacrifice carrying out long-term goals and strategies in favor of troop speed, as the Bush 
Administration did. Use the massive intervention force to carry out the specific goals, 
enforce order, locate loose weapons storages, and when the mission is done, leave. Do 
not give terrorists the option to have time run in their favor so that they may organize and 
plot.  
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 The US should also learn that admitting when a policy has failed is neither weak 
nor foolish. It is something every sincerely moral person or government should do so as 
to avoid that mistake in the future. At this both the Bush and Obama Administrations 
have failed miserably. Speaking to CBS’s Face The Nation former President Bush stated 
that he had “no regrets” about invading Iraq. No doubt many of his most ardent 
supporters feel the same but in light of the above-mentioned evidence it is difficult to see 
how one could believe that. The Iraq War did correlate with a dramatic increase in all 
forms of terrorism, especially Salafist. It largely vindicated Al-Qaeda’s beliefs about the 
US to many Muslims and caused a severe backlash. President Obama has repeated many 
of his predecessor’s follies too. Primarily by claiming the success of various provinces in 
Afghanistan, despite the fact that most of those provinces, like Kandahar, have gone 
through an increased Salafist presence. In Yemen, President Obama claimed that the 
drone program has been a “successful model,” for future counterterrorism policies, 
disregarding the current revolution and increased Salafist presence in that country too. 
While this project did not specifically say the drone program contributes to terrorism, it 
did not also say the drone program hinders Salafist terrorism either. Regardless, admitting 
failure might be difficult, but as the cliché saying goes it is the integral first step to self-
awareness.  
 Another problem the US should address is on the domestic side, for various 
Western states, is that of non-Muslim and Muslim relations. For its part the US, including 
the Bush Administration, has done a decent job at this. The Bush Administrations 2006 
National Security Strategy even went as far to claim that Islam itself is not responsible 
for terrorism and is a religion of peace. The European states, most of which have strong 
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minority political currents of white nationalism and fascism, struggle significantly more. 
Regardless, it is integral to the GWOT effort that Western states not alienate their 
Muslim societies. For the sake of the fight against Salafist terrorists depends on 
demonstrating to Muslim societies that the US is not a belligerent force against Islam, 
rather that we are, and always have been, an open society that respects all citizens. Such 
is the will of our founding fathers anyway.   
  Finally, this project obviously took out all mentioning of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, but that does not mean it is not related. Eventually the US, Israel, and the 
Palestinians will have to craft some fair and even handed agreement. This paper will not 
pretend to know what that will look like, but it will highlight its importance. The reasons 
are ideological. Former CENTCOM head, General James Mattis once remarked “I paid a 
military security price every day as a commander of CENTCOM because the Americans 
were seen as biased in favor of Israel…” Indeed if the US wants credibility in the Middle 
East in combating terror, promoting democracy, and regaining stability it must start there 
first, or risk losing those who may want to align with the US. These ideas mirror those of 
another former CENTCOM head, General David Petraeus when he said, “the enduring 
hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our 
ability to advance our interests in the AOR (area of responsibility),” referring to the 
Middle East and North Africa.116 Crafting a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
will allow the US to do what most successful counter terrorism strategies require to thrive 
off of, the ability to use local troops, sway the interests away from the terrorists, and 
allow the society to eventually develop on its own with some outside help.  	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  Currently it would be difficult to attempt to persuade a group of Arabs or Sunni 
Muslims to join a cause against Salafists or other terrorists when doing so could be seen 
as openly siding with Israel. Crafting a fair political solution to that conflict could end 
once and for all that excuse and could also dwindle some of the interest in joining a 
Salafist group in the first place. Of course it is not a complete solution, but it would 
certainly help the policy aims of the GWOT.  
 These policies are not cure alls. Terrorism, like crime or disease, cannot be 
eliminated, only mitigated. The best way to mitigate it is to first adopt policies that do not 
exacerbate it and second keep the fight against the terrorists only if they present an active 
threat. What the future holds in store for both the Middle East and Salafist terrorism is 
almost impossible to tell. One thing that can be said unquestionably is that the history and 
trajectory of Salafist terrorism is at this point intrinsically linked with that of the US.  
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